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Abstract
We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of diﬀerent types of active labor market
policies (ALMP). In our empirical analysis we use data on 20 OECD countries covering
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Active labor market policies (ALMP) aim at bringing unemployed back to work by im-
proving the functioning of the labor market in various ways. ALMP include programs such
as public employment services, labor market training and subsidized employment. The 1994
OECD Jobs study recommends governments to “strengthen the emphasis on active labor mar-
ket policies and reinforce their eﬀectiveness” (OECD, 1994). Recent studies however are not
very optimistic about the beneﬁts of many of these programs. Heckman et al. (1999) give
a detailed overview of several microeconometric evaluation studies. They conclude that la-
bor market programs have at best a modest impact on participants’ labor market prospects.
Furthermore, there is considerable heterogeneity in the impact of these programs, so for some
groups of workers the programs are more eﬀective than for other groups of workers. Finally,
when programs are implemented on a large scale displacement and general equilibrium eﬀects
may be sizeable. This means that without incorporating them in a macro framework micro
treatment eﬀect evaluations will provide poor guides to public policy. Calmfors, Forslund and
Hemstr¨ om (2001) conclude that the evidence on the eﬀectiveness of Swedish ALMP is rather
disappointing. Labor market retraining for example has no or negative employment eﬀects.
Martin and Grubb (2001) draw similar conclusions in their overview on what works and what
does not work among ALMP in OECD countries. They conclude for example that subsidies
to employment and direct job creation have been of little success in helping unemployed get
permanent jobs. Kluve and Schmidt (2002) also present an overview of evaluation studies
concluding that job search assistance can be useful, private sector subsidies are better than
public sector programs and training programs can help to improve the labor market prospects
of unemployed workers.
If one would draw a general conclusion from the empirical studies based on micro data it
would be that the eﬀects of ALMP on the job ﬁnding rates are rather small. An important
drawback of a lot of ALMP is that they stimulate workers to reduce their search eﬀorts instead
of increasing them. This is due to the so-called locking-in eﬀect (see for example Van Ours,
2004). Other eﬀects are important too. What is eﬀective for an individual unemployed worker
2may not be eﬀective in terms of the aggregate level of unemployment. One reason for this may
be crowding out. If a training program brings an unemployed worker back to work more quickly
at the expense of another unemployed worker ﬁnding a job more slowly the training program is
not very eﬃcient. Another reason for the diﬀerences between individual and aggregate eﬀects
is that a training program may increase the eﬀectiveness of labor supply, which stimulates job
creation. Or it may be that a training program induces a better match between a worker and
a job. In that case job tenure will increase causing a reduction of unemployment through a
reduced inﬂow into unemployment.
This paper investigates the eﬀectiveness of active labor market policies on an aggregate level
both from an empirical and a theoretical point of view. In our empirical analysis we analyze the
eﬀects of ALMP on both unemployment rates and employment-population rates using aggregate
time series - cross section data from 20 OECD countries. We investigate the eﬀects of speciﬁc
categories of ALMP focusing on training, public employment services and subsidized jobs. Our
contribution to the empirical literature on the macro-eﬀects of ALMP is threefold. First, we
base our analysis on more recent data than previous studies did. Second, we investigate the
eﬀects of separate expenditure categories while almost all previous studies focused on total
ALMP-expenditures. Third, instead of focussing on one particular method of analysis we
use a variety of methods. We analyze the eﬀects of ALMP using annual data and 5-years
averages of variables, accounting for random country eﬀects. We also use expenditure shares
for diﬀerent ALMP categories accounting for country ﬁxed eﬀects. As dependent variables we
use the unemployment rate, but also the employment population rates. Finally, we make a
distinction between labor market performance indicators for males and for females. We ﬁnd
that expenditures on labor market training have the largest impact on both the unemployment
rate and the employment-population rate. Public employment services seem to be able to
reduce the unemployment rate but do not aﬀect the employment-population rate. Finally,
subsidized jobs do not seem to have any eﬀect on labor market outcomes.
In our theoretical search-matching model we analyze the eﬀects of subsidized jobs, public
employment services and labor market training. In this model we introduce some parameters
capturing active labor market policies by the government. Training increases the expected
3productivity of the worker. The government can stimulate training by subsidizing training
costs. We also take into account an alternative route to higher productivity. This is through
learning on-the-job. The government can stimulate the on-the-job training route by subsidizing
the creation of vacancies. Simply because there are more vacancies, unemployed will ﬂow more
quickly into jobs and through learning by doing they ﬂow from low productivity to high-
productivity jobs (hence the transition from unemployment to high-productivity jobs happens
more quickly). Finally, the functioning of the labor market can be inﬂuenced through public
employment services. These services can inﬂuence the labor market because matching becomes
more eﬃcient. We ﬁnd that our model explains the empirical results best if (i) the job ﬁnding
rate is hardly aﬀected by ALMP, which is consistent with micro studies (see below), and (ii)
the main eﬀect of ALMP on unemployment is via job duration. The training component of
ALMP scores best because it directly aﬀects this channel while the other measures have only
an indirect eﬀect on job duration.
The set-up of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss previous studies on ALMP
focusing on macro-studies. In Section 3 we discuss our data, the set-up of our analysis and
we present parameter estimates. In Section 4 we present our theoretical model. Section 5
concludes.
2. Empirical evaluation studies
2.1. General overview
Calmfors (1995) distinguishes four basic functions of ALMP: raise output and welfare by
putting unemployed to work or have them invest in human capital, maintain the size of the eﬀec-
tive labor force by keeping up competition for available jobs, help to reallocate labor between
diﬀerent sub-markets, and alleviate the moral-hazard problem of unemployment insurance.
ALMP may eliminate mismatch in the labor market, promote more active search behavior on
the part of the job seekers and have a screening function because they substitute for regular
4work experience in reducing employer uncertainty about the employability of job applicants.
Placements in labor market programs may provide an alternative work test to the eligibility of
unemployment beneﬁts, since some of those who are not genuinely interested in work will prefer
to lose registration rather than to participate in a program. An adverse side eﬀect of ALMP is
that workers are locked-in training and job-creation programs: because of their participation
they reduce their search intensity.
Not only direct eﬀects are important when assessing the eﬀectiveness of ALMP. Calmfors
(1994) distinguishes a number of indirect eﬀects. First there are displacement eﬀects since
jobs created by one program are at the expense of other jobs. Then there are deadweight
eﬀects because labor market programs subsidize hiring that would have occurred anyway in the
absence of the program. There are also substitution eﬀects because jobs created for a certain
category of workers replace jobs for other categories because relative wage costs have changed.
Finally, there are the eﬀects of taxation required to ﬁnance the programs on the behavior of
everyone in society.
In line with the previous distinction between micro and macro eﬀects there are two main
types of evaluation studies of ALMP (Martin and Grubb, 2001): The ﬁrst type uses micro
data to measure the impact of program participation on individuals’ employment and earnings.
The second type uses aggregate data to measure the net eﬀects of programs on aggregate
employment and unemployment. Micro studies have the advantage of a very large number of
observations. Drawbacks are the selection bias and the fact that they provide only estimates
of partial-equilibrium eﬀects. Macro studies are few. Drawbacks of macro studies are that
they are based on few observations, they often lump together various types of training and job
creation schemes and they have to deal with a simultaneity bias.
There are many evaluation studies. A lot of them are done in Sweden, a country that
has used ALMP extensively. In their overview of Swedish studies Calmfors, Forslund and
Hemstr¨ om (2001) conclude that ALMP have probably reduced unemployment but also reduced
regular employment. According to Martin and Grubb (2001) the lessons from the evaluation
studies in OECD countries are the following. Public training programs are among the most
expensive active measures. Some programs have yielded low or even negative rates of return
5for participants, some public training programs work. These programs appear to work for some
target groups (adult women) but not for others (prime-age men, youth). Four crucial features
can increase eﬀectiveness: tight targeting on participants, relative small scale, need to result
in a qualiﬁcation or certiﬁcate that is recognized and valued by the market, strong on-the-job
component (establishing strong links with local employers). Job search assistance is usually the
least costly active labor market program but must be combined with increased monitoring of the
job-search behavior of the unemployed and enforcement of work tests. Subsidies to employment
involve large dead weight losses and substitution eﬀects. Finally, direct job creation has been
of little success in helping unemployed get permanent jobs in the open labor market. Most
jobs provided through direct job creation schemes typically have a low marginal product, they
should be short in duration and not become a disguised form of heavily subsidized permanent
employment.
Kluve and Schmidt (2002) use the outcomes of 53 recent evaluation studies to perform a re-
gression where each program represents 1 datapoint. The eﬀects of ALMP are explained by the
type of program, the study design (experimental versus non-experimental), the timing (1980s
versus 1990s) and the macroeconomic environment. The authors conclude that programs with
a large training content seem to be most likely to improve employment probability. Further-
more, they conclude that both direct job creation and employment subsidies in the public sector
almost always seem to fail. The overview studies by Martin and Grubb (2001), Calmfors et al.
(2001) and Kluve and Schmidt (2002) indicate that there is hardly any empirical research on
the relationship between ALMP and job durations. An important empirical problem is that job
tenure is usually quite long so that the data have to cover a lot of calendar time to be suitable
for an analysis of separation rates.1
1Rare examples of studies that address the relationship between ALMP and job durations are Bonnal et al.
(1997) and Van Ours (2001). Bonnal et al. analyze the eﬀects of various programs on the labor market position
of low skilled young workers and conclude that private sector training courses may generate better matches and
longer subsequent employment durations than programs in the public sector (training or community jobs). Van
Ours (2001) ﬁnds that short-term subsidized jobs have a positive eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate and a negative
eﬀect on the job separation rate. Long-term subsidized jobs reduce the job ﬁnding rate due to a locking-in
eﬀect. Training has a positive eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate, but this is speciﬁc for the labor market studied,
the Slovak labor market. Here attending a training program is often a prerequisite for starting on a new job so
there is no real treatment eﬀect. Neither long-term subsidized jobs nor training aﬀect the job separation rate.
62.2. Macro studies on ALMP
Empirical work on the macroeconomic eﬀects of ALMP is rare. And, often no distinction is
made between types of ALMP. Instead, the focus is on total ALMP-expenditures. The equation
of interest usually exploits cross-country variation in unemployment and ALMP-expenditures:
uit = β0 + β1xit + β2yit + β3∆
2pit + εit (1)
where uit is the unemployment rate (unemployment as a percentage of the labor force) in
country i and calendar year (or time period) t. Furthermore, x is a vector of labor market
institutions, y refers to ALMP-expenditures and ∆2p is the change in inﬂation rate. Finally, εit
is the error term, which in most of the studies is assumed to have a random eﬀects speciﬁcation.
With one exception, which will be discussed below none of the empirical studies uses a ﬁxed
eﬀects speciﬁcation.2
One of the problems related to estimating equation (1) is that if unemployment goes up the
ALMP-expenditures are also likely to increase. To account for this, ALMP-expenditures are
normalized as expenditures per unemployed person as a percentage of GDP per member of the

















where ALMP represents total expenditures on active labor market policies, U is total un-
employment, GDP is total gross domestic product, N is the population and L is the labor
force. Finally, almp is ALMP-expenditures as a percentage of GDP, and l is the labor force
participation rate (labor force as a fraction of the population).
There is a limited number of empirical studies using cross-country time series information
to establish the eﬀects of ALMP. Scarpetta (1996) uses annual data from 17 countries over the
1983-1993 period. As ALMP-variable he uses the expenditures on active measures per unem-
ployed person relative to GDP per capita. He ﬁnds that ALMP have a negative impact on the
2Equation (1) is mainly used to study the unemployment eﬀects of labor market institutions. In this setting
ﬁxed country eﬀects are used in for example Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004) and Nickell et al. (2002). These
studies do not consider the eﬀects of ALMP because relevant data are only available from 1985 onwards.
7unemployment rate but there are also indications of large substitution and displacement eﬀects
on employment. There is a positive correlation between ALMP and the employment-population
rates, which indicates that these policies have a positive eﬀect on labor force participation by
keeping otherwise discouraged workers in the labor force. Elmeskov et al. (1998) analyze
annual data from 19 countries over the period 1983-95. Again the ALMP variable is the public
spending on ALMP per unemployed person relative to GDP per capita. The authors conclude
that ALMP have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the unemployment rate. Nickell and Layard
(1999) analyze 6 years period averages from 20 OECD countries over the period 1983-1994.3
The ALMP-variable is the ALMP spending per unemployed person as a percentage of GDP per
member of the labor force. The authors ﬁnd that ALMP have a negative eﬀect on long-term
unemployment but no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the employment-population rate. Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) have 5 years averages data on 20 OECD countries and analyze the period 1960-
95. As they use a time-invariant country-speciﬁc average ALMP-variable and include country
ﬁxed eﬀects they cannot identify the direct eﬀect of ALMP on the unemployment rate. Instead
they study the interaction between ALMP and shocks concluding that higher expenditures on
ALMP reduce the eﬀects of shocks on unemployment.
One on the main problems in the analysis is the endogeneity problem. It is not only
ALMP that aﬀect unemployment but it is also unemployment that aﬀects ALMP-expenditures.
Previous studies treat this problem in diﬀerent ways. Scarpetta (1996) and Elmeskov et al.
(1998) use the time-invariant average ALMP spending over the period of availability of the data
(1985-1993) as explanatory variable. This of course is only possible by assuming that country-
speciﬁc eﬀects are randomly distributed. Nickell and Layard (1999) renormalized the current
percentage of GDP spent on ALMP measures on the lagged unemployment rate to create an
instrument for the ALMP-variable.4 Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) use country ﬁxed eﬀects
and use time-invariant information about labor market institutions.5 Thus, as indicated before
they cannot determine the direct relationship between ALMP and unemployment because this is
absorbed by the ﬁxed country eﬀects. However, because they have time invariant labor market
3Contrary to other studies the log of the unemployment rate is used as the dependent variable.
4So, the instrumental variable is: zit =
almpit
ui,t−1.li,t−1
5ALMP data of Nickell (1997) are used to calculate country-speciﬁc average over the period 1983-1994.
8institutions, including ALMP-expenditures, they don’t have to deal with the endogeneity issue.
The studies that have been performed do not all point in the same direction. Scarpetta
(1996), Elmeskov et al. (1998), and Nickell and Layard (1999) ﬁnd that ALMP reduce the un-




In the analysis the main variables of interest are the unemployment rate and the employment-
population rate (employment as a percentage of the population) as dependent variable in our
analysis. There is a simple relationship between employment-population rate ep, labor force
participation rate l and unemployment rate u:
ep = l(1 − u) (3)
This relationship can be considered from two perspectives. The ﬁrst perspective is the point
of view of a deﬁnition. Then, conditional on a constant labor force participation rate a fall in
the unemployment rate by deﬁnition implies a rise in the employment-population rate. If the
unemployment rate goes down and the employment-population rate remains constant then by
deﬁnition the labor force participation rate must have gone down. The second perspective on
this equation is the point of view of measurement. If unemployment refers to ‘open’ unemploy-
ment and excludes unemployment in active labor market policies then a fall in unemployment
might concern a spurious fall (Scarpetta, 1996). In this case the employment-population rate is
a better indicator of labor market performance. The OECD has systematic information about
ALMP since 1985. Therefore, in the analysis we use data from 20 OECD countries on the pe-
riod 1985-99. An overview of the dependent variables in our analysis, the unemployment rate
and the employment-population rate, is given in Table 1. As shown over the period of analysis
9there is a wide variation in the unemployment rate ranging from a low 2% in Switzerland to as
high as 15.4% in Spain. Also in terms of employment-population rate there are big diﬀerences
across countries from as low as 66.7% in Belgium to as high as 95.8% in Switzerland.
We estimate the parameters of equation (1), where we investigate the eﬀects of the two
labor market institutions, namely union density and unemployment beneﬁts.6 Table 1 gives
an overview of country averages for these labor market institutions. Union density has a wide
range from a low 10.7% in France to a high 86.9% in Sweden. As shown unemployment beneﬁts
- in terms of replacement rate - vary from a low 10.4% in Japan to a high 56.9% in Denmark.
Finally, tax rates vary from a low 29.6% in the United States to a high 57% in Sweden. Table
1 also gives an overview of expenditures on ALMP. Here too, there is a wide variation going
from a low 0.21% of GDP in the US to a high 2.26% of GDP in Sweden.
In the OECD statistics concerning ALMP the following categories of expenditures are dis-
tinguished:
1. Labor market training: training for unemployed adults and those at risk, training for em-
ployed adults; includes both course costs and subsistence allowances, but special training
programs for youth and disabled are excluded.
2. Subsidized employment: targeted measures to promote or provide employment for the
unemployed and other priority groups (but not youth and the disabled); concerns wage
subsidies paid to private sector ﬁrms to encourage the recruitment of targeted workers or
continued employment of those whose jobs are at risk and concerns support of unemployed
persons starting enterprizes and direct job creation (in public or non-proﬁt organizations)
to beneﬁt the unemployed.
3. Public employment services (PES) and administration: placement, counselling and vo-
6As will be described below we also investigated the eﬀects of taxes but did not ﬁnd any eﬀect on our
variables of interest. Furthermore, we investigated the eﬀects of employment protection and coverage of collective
bargaining but found no signiﬁcant results either. This may be due to the fact that employment protection and
coverage do not change much over time while the cross-sectional variation is picked up by country ﬁxed eﬀects.
Studies like for example Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004) and Nickell et al. (2002) do ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of
employment protection and bargaining variables, but they consider a much longer calendar time period (from
1960 onwards).
10cational guidance, job-search courses, assistance with displacement costs, administering
unemployment beneﬁts, all other administration costs of labor market agencies including
running labor market programs.
4. Youth measures: special programs concerning measures for unemployed and disadvan-
taged youth, support of apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training.
5. Measures for the disabled: special programs concerning vocational rehabilitation and
work for the disabled.
The last two categories refer to speciﬁc groups of workers. Therefore, we focus on the
ﬁrst three categories: training, PES and subsidized jobs. The expenditures are measured as
a percentage of GDP and as shown in Table 2 there are clear diﬀerences between countries.
Whereas Japan only spends 0.30% of GDP on labor market training, Sweden spends 0.63%.
While the US spends 0.7% of GDP on PES and countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain spend
0.9% of GDP on this ALMP, The Netherlands spend 0.36% of their GDP on PES. Also with
respect to expenditures on subsidized jobs the diﬀerences between countries are quite large.
The US spend 0.1% of GDP on subsidized jobs, while Belgium spends 0.72 % of their GDP
on subsidized jobs. These diﬀerences appear both in terms of levels as well as developments.
In Denmark for example public expenditures on labor market training went up from 0.37% in
the second half of the 1980s to 0.99% in the second half of the 1990s. In the same time in
Ireland these expenditures went down from 0.53% to 0.21%. In Sweden the expenditures ﬁrst
went up from 0.51% in the second half of the 1980s to 0.82% in the early 1990s and went back
again to 0.55% in the second half in the 1990s. At the lower end for example is Japan where
the expenditures on labor market training stayed constant at a low level of 0.03%. Similar
diﬀerences occur with respect to the public expenditures on subsidized jobs. In Belgium these
expenditures were always at a high 0.6-0.8% of GDP while in Ireland and Sweden there was
a major increase from about 0.25% in the second half of the 1980s to 0.8-0.85% in the second
half of the 1990s.
3.2. Parameter estimates
11As indicated before, in the analysis of how ALMP aﬀect the unemployment rate (and
the employment-population rate) an important problem, perhaps the main problem, is the
possible endogeneity of ALMP. ALMP may have a negative eﬀect on the unemployment rate
but increasing unemployment may induce the government to expand expenditures on ALMP.
The endogeneity problem also arises from the normalization of the ALMP-expenditures. If
unemployment increases and there is a less than proportional increase in ALMP-expenditures
a spurious negative correlation between the normalized ALMP-variable and the unemployment
rate is introduced. As is clear from the literature overview there is no standard solution to
the endogeneity problem. We will use two diﬀerent solutions. First, we use country-speciﬁc
averages of the ALMP-variable (over the period of analysis). Since these are time invariant
there is no endogeneity bias. Second, we use the shares of separate ALMP categories in total
expenditures as explanatory variables. Whereas the level of expenditures may be subject to an
endogeneity bias the shares are not.
We start our analysis using ALMP-variables that are time invariant in order to avoid the
endogeneity problem.7 As explanatory variables we use normalized expenditures as in (2).
These normalized total expenditures on ALMP are shown in Table 3. Again there are clear
diﬀerences between countries, which are even larger than before normalization. We investigate
the eﬀects of labor market training, PES, and subsidized jobs separately. Because the ALMP
expenditures are constant and country-speciﬁc we cannot use ﬁxed eﬀects. Using random eﬀects
might lead to biased parameter estimates in case the random eﬀects are correlated with the
other explanatory time varying explanatory variables. To investigate whether it is eﬃcient to
use random eﬀects we use the Hausman test.
The ﬁrst parameter estimates are shown in the upper part of Table 3. The ﬁrst column shows
that union density and unemployment beneﬁts have a positive eﬀect on the unemployment rate.
The Hausman-test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the random eﬀects and
the time varying explanatory variables are uncorrelated. This allows us to estimate the eﬀects
7Note that in this case country speciﬁc diﬀerences in other policies that are correlated with the ALMP-policies
will inﬂuence the estimated parameters. In other words, for countries that spend a lot of money on general
education and on labor market training part of the estimated eﬀect of training may be due to expenditures on
general education
12of the ALMP categories. The eﬀect on unemployment of labor market training and PES
is negative, the eﬀect of subsidized jobs is small and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As
expected the change in inﬂation has a negative eﬀect on the unemployment rate. The second
column of Table 3 shows the parameter estimates for the employment-population rate. By
and large, they show the mirror image of the upper part. Now, unemployment beneﬁts and
union density have a negative eﬀect, while labor market training has a clear positive eﬀect.
The eﬀects of PES and subsidized jobs are also positive but insigniﬁcantly so. The parameter
estimates indicate that expenditures on labor market training have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
on the unemployment rate as well as a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the employment-population
rate. For the expenditures on PES the results are less clear. There is a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on unemployment and no eﬀect on the employment-population rate. This means that
expenditures on PES have a negative eﬀect on the labor force participation rate. The decline in
open unemployment is due to transition of unemployed to ALMP. An alternative explanation
is that there is no true eﬀect of expenditures on PES because the employment-population rate
is a better indicator of labor market slack than the unemployment rate. For subsidized jobs
we ﬁnd that they do not have a negative eﬀect on the unemployment rate, nor do they have a
positive eﬀect on the employment-population rate.
It is sometimes advocated that ALMP serve as an incentive mechanism in case the replace-
ment rate is high (Nickell and Layard, 1999). This could explain why in Nordic countries
where the replacement rate is high also a lot of money is spend on ALMP.8 To investigate this
in more detail we allow for an interaction term between unemployment beneﬁts and ALMP-
expenditures to aﬀect the variables of interest. Because this interaction term is time varying we
use country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in our estimates. It turns out that this interaction is not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for expenditures on PES and subsidized jobs. However, as shown
in the third and fourth column of Table 3 the interaction between unemployment beneﬁts and
expenditures on labor market training does aﬀect the labor market outcomes. For the unem-
ployment rate the interaction term of labor market training and unemployment beneﬁts has a
8As Kluve and Schmidt (2002) indicate a high unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate is typical for countries
with intense ALMP in operation.
13negative eﬀect. This implies that the unemployment reducing eﬀect of labor market training
is larger when unemployment beneﬁts are high. For the employment-population rate we again
ﬁnd the mirror image; the eﬀect of labor market training is larger when unemployment beneﬁts
are high.
As an alternative way to account for the potential endogeneity of ALMP-expenditures we
introduce the shares of expenditures as explanatory variables and use the time invariant expen-
ditures on the sum of training, PES and subsidized jobs to scale the expenditure shares. The





where al is the sum of the expenditures on training, employment services and subsidized jobs
and ali is the average of this variable over the period. The share of expenditures on PES is
deﬁned accordingly. By nature the share of expenditures is not inﬂuenced by any endogeneity
bias. And, the time series variation allows us to use country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.9 The lower
part of Table 3 shows the parameter estimates. The eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts and union
density are similar as before. The ﬁrst column shows that the share of expenditures on labor
market training has a negative eﬀect on the unemployment rate. For the share of expenditures
on PES we also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect, but the relevant parameter is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. The parameter estimates for the employment-population rate show the mirror image; the
eﬀect of labor market training is signiﬁcantly positive while the eﬀect of PES is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, at a 5% level of signiﬁcance. So, again the parameter estimates indicate
that labor market training is the most eﬀective ALMP in terms of the aggregate labor market
outcome. The expenditures on PES are less eﬀective, but better than those on subsidized jobs.
Introducing the interaction between the share of expenditures on labor market training and
unemployment beneﬁts we again ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect. Here too, the parameter
estimates for the employment-population rate show the mirror image; the interaction between
training and unemployment beneﬁts is signiﬁcantly positive.
9Note that by deﬁnition the sum of the expenditure shares is equal to 1, so we cannot estimate the separate
eﬀects of all three shares. What we estimate is the relative eﬀects of training and PES, relative to subsidized
jobs.
14To give some idea about the size of the eﬀects we use the parameters in the ﬁrst column
of the upper part of Table 3 as basis for some calculations. The starting point is a labor
market where the unemployment rate is 8.0%, the labor force participation rate is 70% and
expenditures on labor market training are 0.25% of GDP.10 If the expenditures on labor market
training increase to 0.25% of GDP the unemployment rate goes down to 7.7% in the short run.
And, because the decline in unemployment increases the eﬀect of the labor market training
expenditures in the long run the unemployment rate goes down to 6.8%. This is quite a large
eﬀect and could have to do with country speciﬁc correlation between training expenditures and
other policy measures that reduce unemployment. If we take the parameters in the ﬁrst column
of the lower part of Table 3 as basis for the same calculations we ﬁnd that an increase in the
training expenditures from 0.2% to 0.25% of GDP reduces the unemployment rate from 8.0%
to 7.7% in the short run and to 7.6% in the long run.11
3.3. Sensitivity analysis
The general results of the estimates are clear. To investigate the sensitivity of the parameter
estimates we performed additional analyses.12 In addition to the analysis with country speciﬁc
ALMP-averages based on yearly data we also used 5-years averages to perform the same analy-
sis. In the literature this is done to smoothen the cyclical eﬀects. Table 4 shows the parameter
estimates. This additional analysis basically conﬁrms the estimation results based on annual
data; labor market training is inﬂuencing both the unemployment rate and the employment-
population rate, PES inﬂuence only the unemployment rate and expenditures on subsidized
jobs do not seem to have an eﬀect.
10Note that the sample averages are 8.1% for the unemployment rate, 71.8% for the labor force participation
rate and 0.25% of GDP for labor market training expenditures.
11Because the ALMP variables in the lower part of Table 3 are time varying they are less sensitive to country-
speciﬁc correlations in diﬀerent types of policies aﬀecting unemployment. Therefore, the latter estimates are
probably more reliable than the previous estimates.
12In addition to the analyses presented here we also checked whether accounting for autocorrelation aﬀects
the parameter estimates. While this has some inﬂuence on the parameter estimates for union density and
unemployment beneﬁts it basically does not alter the parameter estimates for the ALMP-categories. We also
checked whether the exclusion of some countries (in particular Sweden) alters our estimation results. This turns
out not to be the case.
15We also investigated whether unemployment rates and employment rates of males and
females are aﬀected in a diﬀerent way. Table 5 shows the parameter estimates for males; Table
6 shows the parameter estimates for females. The basic set-up of these tables is the same as
Table 3. The main diﬀerences between males and females are the following. The eﬀect of
unemployment beneﬁts on the unemployment rate is larger for females than for males. Union
density has a negative eﬀect on the employment-population rate of females and no signiﬁcant
eﬀect for males. Concerning the ALMP training seems to be more eﬃcient for females than
for males. Expenditures on public employment services lower the unemployment rate for both
males and females but only have a positive eﬀect on the employment-population rate of males.13
4. The model
In the empirical analysis, we have focused on three types of ALMP: training of unemployed
workers (TU), subsidized employment (SE) and public employment services (PES). This section
introduces a theoretical model that helps in understanding the following main results from the
empirical analysis. First, the observation that TU does very well in reducing unemployment and
increasing the employment-population rate. Second, the observation that SE and PES are not so
eﬀective in reducing unemployment and rather ineﬀective in raising the employment-population
rate. Finally, the model gives an explanation for the interaction eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts
and TU on the unemployment rate.
The relationships between speciﬁc types of ALMP and parameters in the theoretical model
are the following. The eﬀect of training is modelled as a subsidy to training costs of unemployed
workers. The eﬀect of employment services is modelled as a subsidy to search costs of workers.
Finally, the subsidized employment is modelled as a subsidy for the value of the match of low
productive jobs.
13Martin and Grubb (2001) indicate that the eﬀect of diﬀerent ALMP are gender-speciﬁc. They indicate for
example that formal class-room training and on-the-job training appears to help for female entrants to the labor
market but does not seem to help for prime-age men. They also indicate that job-search assistance appears to
help most unemployed but in particular, women and sole parents.
16The model introduces two channels through which ALMP can potentially reduce unem-
ployment. First, government measures can increase the job ﬁnding rate, that is the speed with
which the unemployed ﬂow into employment. Second, through training the unemployed can
get better jobs. In particular, we assume that high skilled jobs pay a higher wage and are less
likely to be destroyed. Hence if ALMP causes more unemployed to end up in high skilled jobs,
it reduces unemployment by decreasing the ﬂow from employment to unemployment. It turns
out that the eﬀects of ALMP on the job ﬁnding rate are ambiguous theoretically. Moreover, we
know from micro studies that the eﬀects on the job ﬁnding rate are very small indeed. Hence
we focus on the mechanism via the quality of the job and the ﬂow from employment to unem-
ployment. Focussing on this eﬀect, we can explain the three basic empirical ﬁndings mentioned
above including the interaction eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts and TU on the unemployment
rate.
In our model, an agent who is unemployed has to decide on two things: search intensity s and
training intensity e. Search intensity s for a worker yields a disutility of γ(s) and a probability
of ﬁnding a job of sm(θ), where m(θ) denotes the rate with which a worker is matched with a
ﬁrm as a function of labor market tightness. Labor market tightness θ is deﬁned as the ratio
of vacancies v over eﬀective search by the unemployed u: θ ≡ v
su. Training intensity e yields
a disutility χ(e) and (conditional on ﬁnding a job) a high productivity job with probability
e ∈ h0,1i and a low productivity job with probability 1−e, where χ(0) = 0,χ0(e) > 0,χ00(e) > 0
and χ0(0) = 0. The search eﬀort function γ(s) features γ (0) = 0,γ0 (s) > 0,γ00 (s) > 0 and
γ0 (0) = 0. These are fairly standard assumptions for disutility functions.
Let yh (yl) denote a worker’s output in the high (low) productivity job. Further, let δl
denote the exogenous rate by which a low skilled match dissolves. We assume that the corre-
sponding rate for a high skilled job is smaller, δh < δl.14 Finally, ε ≥ 0 denotes the exogenous
probability that a worker in a low productivity job, through learning by doing, ends up in a
high productivity job.
14This is consistent with empirical evidence that job separation rates decline with the skill of workers (see for
example OECD (1997)).




b − κ − (1 − σγ)γ(s) − (1 − σχ)χ(e)
+sm(θ)[eVh + (1 − e)Vl − Vu]

(5)
ρVh = wh + δh (Vu − Vh) (6)
ρVl = wl + ε(Vh − Vl) + δl (Vu − Vl) (7)
where Vu denotes the value of being unemployed, Vh (Vl) the value of having a high (low)
productivity job. The policy instruments σγ,σχ ∈ [0,1] denote the reduction in search costs
due to PES and the reduction in workers’ training costs due to TU. The parameter κ ≥ 0
denotes the negative eﬀect of being in an ALMP programme. This can be a stigma eﬀect or
the disutility of being monitored in a training or PES programme. Hence κ = 0 if the worker
does not participate in such programmes.
The value of being unemployed ρVu equals the sum of four terms. There is unemployment
beneﬁt level b reduced by the eﬀort costs of search and training and the stigma disutility if the
worker participates in ALMP. Then there is the probability sm(θ) of ﬁnding a job and leaving
unemployment. With probability e (1 − e) the worker ﬁnds a high (low) productivity job with
corresponding expected discounted proﬁts Vh (Vl). The value of having a high productivity job
ρVh equals the wage wh you earn until (with probability δh) the match is dissolved and you
become unemployed again. The value of a low productivity job ρVl is comparable except that
now there is a probability ε that by learning by doing the low productivity job turns into a
high productivity job.
The participation of agents in the labor market is determined by the value of their outside
opportunities ω. Outside opportunities include value of leisure, home production, taking care
of the children etc. We assume that ω is distributed on [ω, ¯ ω] with distribution function F(ω)
and we normalize the size of the population at 1 (i.e. F (¯ ω) = 1). An agent only joins the labor
market if the value of doing so exceeds the outside opportunity of staying at home: ρVu ≥ ω.15
It follows that the participation rate (fraction of the population participating in the labor
market) is given by l = F (ρVu). Further total unemployment is given by F (ρVu)u and the
15Hence we assume that people cannot ﬁnd a job right away when they are outside of the labor force. If
an agent wants to work, he ﬁrst becomes unemployed and then ﬁnds a job. Because of this assumption, the
relevant comparison is between ω and ρVu.
18employment population rate equals ep = F (ρVu)(1 − u).
Turning to the other side of the labor market, the Bellman equations for ﬁrms can be written
as follows.
ρJv = −c +
m(θ)
θ
(eJh + (1 − e)Jl − Jv) (8)
ρJh = yh − wh + δh (Jv − Jh) (9)
ρJl = yl + σyl − wl + ε(Jh − Jl) + δl (Jv − Jl) (10)
where Jv is the value for a ﬁrm of posting a vacancy, Jh (Jl) denotes the value of the ﬁrm
matched with a worker in the high (low) productivity state. The cost of opening a vacancy
equals c. The probability that the ﬁrm’s vacancy is matched with a worker equals
m(θ)
θ and





θ (1 − e)). The probabilities δl,δh and ε are the same as the
ones above in the worker’s problem. The job subsidy given by the government takes the form
here of increasing the value of the match in the low productivity state by σyl. We assume that
the government does not subsidize high productivity jobs, as indeed governments target such
subsidies at the bottom of the labor market. As usual, we assume that there is free entry in
posting vacancies and hence Jv = 0.
Finally, we have the following equations of motion for the unemployment rate, percentage
of participating workers in high productivity jobs and low productivity jobs.
˙ ut = δhnht + δlnlt − stm(θt)ut (11)
˙ nht = −δhnht + εnlt + stm(θt)etut (12)
nlt = 1 − (ut + nht) (13)
Note that because of the assumption of linear vacancy costs, the size of the labor market F (ρVu)
has no eﬀect on the unemployment and employment rates. In steady state the unemployment





δh(ε+δl) (δh + ε + e(δl − δh))
19Hence an increase in the job ﬁnding rate sm(θ) and in the training eﬀort e reduce the
steady state unemployment level. The former through increasing the ﬂow from unemployment
to employment, the latter through reducing the ﬂow in the opposite direction.
4.1. Solving the model
In this section we solve the model for search eﬀort s, training eﬀort e and the participation
rate F (ρVu). To do this we start by deriving the wages for high and low productivity jobs.
We assume that workers and ﬁrms Nash bargain about the wage in each state. That is wh











This leads to the following well known expressions for the wage rates.
Lemma 1 The wages equal
wh = (1 − β)yh + βρVu (14)
wl = (1 − β)(yl + σyl) + βρVu (15)
With these wages, we can determine Vu,Vh,Vl,Jh and Jl. The next result shows the equa-
tions determining s,e,ρVu and θ.
Lemma 2 The ﬁrst order conditions for training and search intensity of an individual can be
written as
(1 − σχ)χ
















































































Finally, labor market tightness is determined by
θ =




As one can verify, these equations follow from the Bellman equations above. First, consider
the eﬀects of the instruments σγ,σχ and σyl on the job ﬁnding rate sm(θ). We argue that these
eﬀects are theoretically ambiguous and therefore presumably not particularly strong. As σγ
is raised, the marginal costs of search go down. Thus there is a tendency for the unemployed
to search more. However, the rise in σγ also reduces the level of search costs and hence raises
the value of being unemployed. This leads to a locking in eﬀect. As being unemployed is
not so bad anymore, there is less incentive to escape unemployment through search and/or
training. The locking in eﬀect leads to lower search and training intensities which both tend
to raise unemployment. A similar ambiguity is found in the case of TU. On the one hand,
a rise in σχ reduces marginal training costs and hence stimulates training eﬀort. Since this
raises the probability of ﬁnding a high wage job, it also stimulates search. On the other hand,
the following locking in eﬀect is present. By reducing the level of training costs, the value
of being unemployed goes up. This reduces the incentive to ﬁnd a job. Finally, consider
SE, parameterized here as a rise in σyl. This raises the pay oﬀ in low wage jobs and hence
stimulates search. But by reducing the wage diﬀerential between high and low skilled jobs, it
reduces training intensity. This decreases the probability of getting a high wage job, an eﬀect
that reduces search and the job ﬁnding rate.
These ambiguous theoretical eﬀects of ALMP instruments on the job ﬁnding rate are rem-
iniscent of empirical studies on micro data which do not ﬁnd strong eﬀects either of ALMP on
the job ﬁnding rate.16 Beside the ambiguous theoretical results above, another reason for such
16See for example Calmfors et al. (2001) and Martin and Grubb (2001). As indicated in the introduction
there is hardly any evidence on the eﬀects of ALMP on the job separation rate. Bonnal et al. (1997) ﬁnd that
some training courses reduce the job separation rate. Van Ours (2001) ﬁnds that short term wage subsidies
reduce the job separation rate.
21empirical ﬁndings can be that search is rather inelastic (i.e. γ00 (s) is big).
Since we do ﬁnd in the data that some ALMP instruments reduce unemployment, but do
not wish to rely on a theoretical explanation that is contradicted by micro evidence, we analyze
the model above under the assumption that the eﬀects on sm(θ) are small. Put diﬀerently, we
assume that the eﬀects of ALMP on the job ﬁnding rate are dominated by the eﬀects outlined
below which focus on the quality of the job found by the unemployed. To do this, we assume
that search ¯ s, tightness ¯ θ and thus the job ﬁnding rate ¯ sm
 ¯ θ

are exogenously ﬁxed. The
following proposition characterizes the eﬀects of ALMP and unemployment beneﬁts in this
case. Proof of the proposition can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1 For given job ﬁnding rate ¯ sm
 ¯ θ





∂σyl > 0, ∂Vu




∂σyl < 0, ∂e
∂σχ > 0, ∂e




∂σyl > 0, ∂u
∂σχ < 0, ∂u





∂σχ∂b < 0 if χ000 (e) > 0 is big enough.
Hence all three programmes increase the value of being unemployed. However, if the pro-
gramme causes a stigma eﬀect, it reduces the value of being unemployed. Similarly, an increase
in the unemployment beneﬁt raises the value of being unemployed. These eﬀects of σγ and σχ
on Vu are the locking in eﬀects described above.




is given) on the unemployment rate. The eﬀect on the unemployment rate has the
opposite sign from the eﬀect on training e since more training leads to a higher probability of
ﬁnding a high skilled job which has a lower separation rate. Hence unemployment goes down,
as e goes up by reducing the outﬂow from employment into unemployment.
An increase in σγ does not directly aﬀect the incentive to train, but it does raise the value of
being unemployed. As the value of being unemployed is increased, getting a job with a higher
separation rate is less of a problem. Hence the incentive to train is reduced. Via this mechanism
PES raises unemployment. To the extent that participating in a PES programme introduces
22a stigma eﬀect (κ goes up), it tends to reduce unemployment by decreasing the value of being
unemployed and therefore stimulating training.
Introducing SE for low skilled jobs, reduces the incentive to get a high skilled job by de-
creasing the wage diﬀerential. As shown in lemma 1, wh − wl falls with σyl. Hence training
eﬀort goes down and unemployment goes up. It is not clear whether there would be a stigma
(κ) eﬀect in this case working in the opposite direction. Similarly, an increase in unemployment
beneﬁts reduces training and hence raises unemployment.
Further, consider the eﬀect of TU on training intensity. By reducing the marginal costs
of training, an increase in σχ raises training eﬀort. On the other hand, σχ also reduces the
level of training costs and hence raises the value of being unemployed. This tends to reduce
training eﬀort. As we show in the appendix, under the assumptions made above, the former
eﬀect always dominates the latter. The intuition for this is discounting (ρ > 0).17 The direct
reduction of marginal training costs due to the increase in σχ happens now and is not discounted.
The increase in Vu which reduces the future (after the worker has found a job) wage diﬀerential
wh−wl comes in in a discounted way and hence weighs less. Therefore the direct eﬀect outweighs
the indirect eﬀect of σχ. Hence, a rise in σχ stimulates training and reduces unemployment.
And because σχ raises Vu and thus the gross participation rate F (ρVu), we ﬁnd that TU
unambiguously raises the employment population rate. In the other cases, we do not get such
an unambiguous result. Not even if we use the stigma eﬀect κ. The eﬀect of κ is to reduce Vu
and thereby stimulate training, but it also directly reduces participation F (ρVu).
Summarizing, focussing on the quality of job and assuming that the eﬀects of ALMP on
the job ﬁnding rate are small, we ﬁnd the following eﬀects. First, TU by directly stimulating
training eﬀort and by raising the value of being unemployed unambiguously reduces the value
of being unemployed and raises the employment-population rate. The direct eﬀect of PES on
training is to reduce it, thereby raising unemployment. If PES causes a stigma eﬀect, it reduces
the value of being unemployment, thereby stimulating training and reducing unemployment.
However, the reduction in Vu then reduces participation and hence we get an ambiguous eﬀect











> 0 which follows
from ρ > 0.
23on the employment-population rate. Indeed, in the data there is no strong positive eﬀect of
PES on the employment-population rate. The direct eﬀect of SE on training is to reduce it
and hence it tends to raise unemployment. But the eﬀect on the employment-population rate
is ambiguous, since SE raises Vu and hence stimulates participation.
Finally, we ﬁnd that an increase in b makes the training subsidy more eﬀective in reducing
unemployment. The main eﬀect is that by raising b, training eﬀort goes down (∂e
∂b < 0) and
therefore the unemployed moves to a part of the eﬀort cost function χ(.) that is more elastic
(here we use the assumption that χ000 (e) > 0). This eﬀect dominates other eﬀects if χ000 (e)
is big enough. The idea is that if the worker invests already a lot in training, a subsidy will
increase this eﬀort further but not by much. The marginal training costs are already so high,
that further increases in eﬀort are hard to realize. But higher unemployment beneﬁts imply a
lower training eﬀort and hence there is more room to increase eﬀort further. Another eﬀect is










δh(ε+δl) (δh + ε + e(δl − δh))
2
is big in absolute value if the denominator is small. The denominator is small if e is small,
which is exactly what a high value of b establishes. In other words, if e is small, unemployment
is rather high and reducing it is relatively easy. Hence for higher b the increase in e (due to a
rise in σχ) has a bigger eﬀect on unemployment u.
The model does not distinguish between male and female agents, but in the data we ﬁnd
that the training programme is relatively more eﬀective for women. The model suggests two
ways in which we can interpret this diﬀerence. First, it may be the case that women have a low
training eﬀort level to start with. Then, as we showed above, there is more opportunity for an
increase in eﬀort and hence a training subsidy is more eﬀective. One reason why women have
a lower training eﬀort may be because their job arrival rate sm(θ) is lower. If these women are
re-entering the labor force, their lower work experience compared to men would reduce their
job ﬁnding rate. Second, again using the idea that these women are re-entering the labor force,
it may be the case that the women in the training programme are on average better educated
than the men in the programme. For instance, women may use the training to get up to date
24again with their knowledge. This makes training very eﬀective for them.
5. Conclusions
We present an empirical and a theoretical analysis of diﬀerent types of active labor market
policies intended to get unemployed back to work. In our empirical analysis we use data
from 20 OECD countries on the period 1985-99 focusing on training, PES and subsidized
jobs. We estimate the eﬀects of these ALMP in the context of an equilibrium unemployment
framework where other labor market institutions also aﬀect unemployment. The results of
our empirical analysis indicate that increases in union density and unemployment beneﬁts
cause a rise in unemployment. An increase in expenditures on both labor market training and
PES cause unemployment to fall. To investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to
measurement problems concerning the unemployment rate we performed similar analyses using
the employment-participation rate as dependent variable. We ﬁnd that increases in union
density and unemployment beneﬁts cause the employment-population rate to fall while a rise
in taxes has no signiﬁcant eﬀect. A rise in expenditures on PES has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
employment-population rate while an increase in expenditures on labor market training causes
the employment-population rate to increase. Expenditures on subsidized jobs do not aﬀect the
unemployment rate nor do they aﬀect the employment-population rate. All in all, expenditures
on labor market training seem to have a larger impact on the functioning of the labor market
than expenditures on PES have. The eﬀect of expenditures on labor market training is larger
the higher unemployment beneﬁts are. Expenditures on subsidized jobs seem a waste of money
from the perspective of the aggregate labor market outcomes.
Our results are in line with previous studies on the eﬀectiveness of ALMP based on macro
studies. Other studies ﬁnd that ALMP reduce unemployment. We add to this a distinction
between diﬀerent types of ALMP indicating that job training is most eﬀective in reducing the
unemployment rate and increasing the employment-population rate. In this respect there is a
clear diﬀerence with micro based evaluation studies. To explain the dichotomy between em-
pirical studies based on micro data that usually ﬁnd small (if any) eﬀects of training on the
25job ﬁnding rate and our empirical results we perform a theoretical analysis. In our theoreti-
cal search-matching model we investigate under which conditions it makes sense to introduce
training programs and under which conditions alternative ways to build up human capital of
unemployed workers should be preferred. We show that even if training does not inﬂuence
the job ﬁnding rate it may still reduce the unemployment rate because of its eﬀect on the job
separation rate. By improving the quality of the match between worker and job the inﬂow into
unemployment is reduced.
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29Appendix A. Data
All data are from the OECD labor market statistics.
1. Unemployment rate, employment population rate, labor force participation rate: concerns
individuals aged 15 to 64 years.
2. (Trade) union density: For Australia, Canada, UK and US the numbers are based on
surveys; for the other countries administrative data are used.
3. Unemployment beneﬁts: OECD summary measure of beneﬁt entitlements; this informa-
tion is available every two years, for the years in between the average of the two adjacent
years is used.
4. Taxes: General government current tax and non-tax receipts as a percent of nominal
GDP.
5. Inﬂation: Consumer prices indices in percentage change from the previous period.
6. almp: public expenditures on labor market programs as a percentage of GDP.
7. Other information used concerns collective bargaining coverage, strictness of employment
protection legislation.
Appendix B. Proofs of the results in the main text
Proof of proposition 1
We derive here the results for the training subsidy σχ, the other derivations are similar. We
start with the eﬀect of σχ on Vu (for given ¯ sm
 ¯ θ




















The sign of this expression follows from the following inequalities:
(1 − β)ρ
ρ + δh
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Hence we ﬁnd ∂e






































,hence a suﬃcient condition for this inequal-









which holds because of the assumptions χ(0) = 0 and χ00 (e) > 0 as can be seen as follows.
Using a Taylor expansion we can write
χ(0) = χ(e) + χ




00 (ζ)(0 − e)
2
for some ζ ∈ h0,ei. Since χ(0) = 0 and χ00 (.) > 0 we see that χ0 (e)e > χ(e) which is the
required inequality.




































∂b < 0 and ∂e
∂σχ > 0 we ﬁnd that a suﬃcient condition for ∂2u
∂b∂σχ < 0 is that ∂2e
∂b∂σχ > 0.
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∂σχ > 0. Hence the sign of ∂2e
∂b∂σχ is determined by three terms. The ﬁrst, labelled
(a) is negative as ∂e
∂b < 0. The second and third ((b) and (c) resp.) are positive. A suﬃcient
condition for (b) to dominate (a) is that χ000 (e) is big. Q.E.D.
32Appendix C. Tables
Table 1 Characteristics of labor markets; averages 1985-99 (%)a)
u ep ud ub τ almp
1. Australia 8.3 77.9 37.4 25.5 32.3 0.48
2. Austria 3.5 77.9 43.1 29.2 47.5 0.35
3. Belgium 8.2 66.7 51.7 40.9 45.6 1.31
4. Canada 9.4 75.3 34.2 28.8 39.4 0.55
5. Denmark 6.4 81.5 75.1 56.9 54.7 1.46
6. Finland 9.8 71.5 74.9 38.0 49.4 1.31
7. France 8.9 68.6 10.7 36.9 46.2 1.05
8. Germany 6.5 75.8 30.6 28.2 42.4 1.18
9. Greece 5.8 70.7 28.3 15.7 34.6 0.33
10. Ireland 13.3 69.5 56.1 28.8 37.8 1.47
11. Japan 2.9 86.9 25.1 10.4 30.3 0.28
12. Netherlands 5.9 75.3 25.4 50.6 44.9 1.40
13. New Zealand 7.0 78.4 38.9 30.6 42.4 0.81
14. Norway 4.3 81.3 56.4 39.3 50.0 0.88
15. Portugal 4.8 79.1 32.6 34.2 35.9 0.66
16. Spain 15.4 66.6 15.1 32.7 36.5 0.62
17. Sweden 6.3 77.3 86.9 28.2 57.0 2.26
18. Switzerland 2.0 95.8 23.5 26.4 – 0.38
19. United Kingdom 9.6 76.8 36.1 18.3 37.5 0.58
20. United States 5.8 80.6 15.2 12.4 29.6 0.21
a) u = unemployment rate (% of labor force), ep = employment-population rate, ud = union density,
ub = unemployment beneﬁts, τ = tax rate, almp = total expenditures on ALMP (% of GDP).
b) Taxes in Spain 1995-99; ALMP expenditures for Denmark, Portugal, and United States 1986-99;
for Greece 1985-98, for Ireland 1985-91 and 1994-96, for Japan 1987-99, for Sweden 1985-95, 1997-99.
33Table 2 Public expenditures on categories of ALMP; averages 1985-99 (% of GDP)a)
tr pe sj ot almp almp∗b)
1. Australia 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.48 7.9
2. Austria 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.35 13.6
3. Belgium 0.24 0.19 0.72 0.16 1.31 18.6
4. Canada 0.26 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.55 7.9
5. Denmark 0.61 0.10 0.31 0.43 1.46 25.9
6. Finland 0.37 0.13 0.57 0.24 1.31 22.4
7. France 0.33 0.14 0.23 0.33 1.05 14.4
8. Germany 0.37 0.22 0.31 0.28 1.18 23.5
9. Greece 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.33 6.4
10. Ireland 0.40 0.20 0.42 0.46 1.47 16.2
11. Japan 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.01 0.28 13.4
12. Netherlands 0.25 0.36 0.13 0.66 1.40 31.3
13. New Zealand 0.37 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.81 17.5
14. Norway 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.41 0.88 26.9
15. Portugal 0.21 0.09 0.08 0.28 0.66 16.8
16. Spain 0.12 0.09 0.33 0.08 0.62 5.4
17. Sweden 0.63 0.25 0.50 0.88 2.26 70.1
18. Switzerland 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.38 27.0
19. United Kingdom 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.21 0.58 8.9
20. United States 0.07 0.17 0.01 0.07 0.21 4.8
a) tr = training, pe = public employment services, sj = subsidized jobs, ot = other; see also footnote
b of Table 1; the sj expenditures for Switzerland: 1991-95, 1997-99
b) Spending per unemployed person as a percentage of GDP per member of the labor force
34Table 3 Estimation results unemployment rate and employment-population rate,
1985-1999a)
a. ALMP period averages
u ep u ep
ub 0.083 (2.1) -0.204 (3.7) 0.414 (5.1) -0.358 (3.3)
ud 0.041 (1.8) -0.175 (5.6) 0.096 (3.9) -0.212 (6.9)
tr -0.648 (2.0) 1.916 (2.7) - -
pe -1.027 (2.5) 1.112 (1.2) - -
sj 0.169 (0.5) 0.266 (0.4) - -
tr ∗ ub - - -0.053 (4.3) 0.031 (2.0)
∆2p -0.236 (3.3) 0.129 (1.4) -0.240 (3.4) 0.155 (1.7)
RE RE FE FE
χ2= 1.2 χ2= 4.7
b. ALMP shares
u ep u ep
ub 0.126 (2.8) -0.270 (4.7) 0.212 (4.0) -0.360 (5.2)
ud 0.054 (2.2) -0.194 (6.1) 0.068 (2.7) -0.208 (6.6)
str -0.328 (3.4) 0.469 (3.8) - -
spe -0.134 (1.3) 0.166 (1.3) - -
str ∗ ub - - -0.010 (3.9) 0.011 (3.5)
∆2p -0.257 (3.6) 0.156 (1.7) -0.249 (3.6) 0.142 (1.6)
FE FE FE FE
a) 300 observations for ALMP period averages and 278 observations for ALMP shares; RE = country
random eﬀects, FE = country ﬁxed eﬀects; absolute t-values in parentheses; the χ2-value represents
the Hausman-test
35Table 4 Estimation results unemployment rate and employment-population rate;
5-year averages; 1985-1999a)
a. ALMP period averages
u ep u ep
ub 0.104 (1.7) -0.199 (1.8) 0.512 (2.8) -0.426 (1.6)
ud 0.026 (0.7) -0.097 (1.4) 0.103 (1.9) -0.228 (3.0)
tr -0.589 (1.7) 1.656 (2.2) - -
pe -0.985 (2.4) 1.112 (1.2) - -
sj 0.153 (0.5) 0.521 (0.1) - -
tr ∗ ub - - -0.0006 (2.4) 0.0003 (1.0)
∆2p -1.235 (2.1) 0.978 (1.1) -1.372 (2.4) 1.087 (1.3)
RE RE FE FE
χ2= 4.0 χ2= 4.1
a) 60 observations; RE = country random eﬀects, FE = country ﬁxed eﬀects; absolute t-values in
parentheses; the χ2-value represents the Hausman-test
36Table 5 Estimation results unemployment rate and employment-population rate;
males, 1985-1999a)
a. ALMP period averages
u ep u ep
ub 0.056 (1.4) -0.189 (3.3) 0.355 (3.7) -0.401 (3.2)
ud 0.036 (1.5) -0.028 (0.8) 0.064 (2.4) -0.046 (1.3)
tr -0.428 (1.5) 0.541 (0.9) - -
pe -0.854 (2.3) 1.593 (2.0) - -
sj 0.085 (0.3) -0.087 (0.1) - -
tr ∗ ub - - -0.046 (3.5) 0.032 (1.8)
∆2p -0.280 (3.7) 0.245 (2.5) -0.264 (3.5) 0.321 (2.3)
RE RE FE FE
χ2= 0.4 χ2= 0.4
b. ALMP shares
u ep u ep
ub 0.110 (2.3) -0.254 (4.1) 0.206 (3.6) -0.346 (4.6)
ud 0.041 (1.6) -0.023 (0.7) 0.058 (2.2) -0.048 (1.4)
str -0.400 (3.9) 0.530 (4.0) - -
spe -0.204 (1.9) 0.459 (3.3) - -
str ∗ ub - - -0.011 (4.1) 0.011 (3.2)
∆2p -0.307 (4.1) 0.277 (2.9) -0.296 (4.0) 0.258 (2.6)
FE FE FE FE
a) 300 observations for ALMP period averages and 278 observations for ALMP shares; RE = country
random eﬀects, FE = country ﬁxed eﬀects; absolute t-values in parentheses; the χ2-value represents
the Hausman-test
37Table 6 Estimation results unemployment rate and employment-population rate;
females, 1985-1999a)
a. ALMP period averages
u ep u ep
ub 0.125 (3.1) -0.225 (3.3) 0.473 (5.4) -0.685 (5.5)
ud 0.058 (2.4) -0.322 (8.2) 0.098 (4.0) -0.330 (8.2)
tr -1.031 (2.4) 3.304 (3.6) - -
pe -1.303 (2.3) 0.587 (0.5) - -
sj 0.274 (0.6) 0.608 (0.7) - -
tr ∗ ub - - -0.055 (4.5) 0.081 (5.1)
∆2p -0.180 (2.5) 0.004 (0.0) -0.159 (2.3) -0.025 (0.2)
RE RE FE FE
χ2= 3.2 χ2= 22.3
b. ALMP shares
u ep u ep
ub 0.157 (3.4) -0.298 (4.1) 0.234 (4.4) -0.388 (4.5)
ud 0.074 (3.0) -0.367 (9.2) 0.084 (3.4) -0.368 (9.2)
str -0.237 (2.4) 0.402 (2.6) - -
spe -0.003 (0.3) -0.204 (1.2) - -
str ∗ ub - - -0.008 (3.4) 0.012 (2.9)
∆2p -0.194 (2.7) 0.025 (0.2) -0.190 (2.7) 0.017 (0.2)
FE FE FE FE
a) 300 observations for ALMP period averages and 278 observations for ALMP shares; RE = country
random eﬀects, FE = country ﬁxed eﬀects; absolute t-values in parentheses; the χ2-value represents
the Hausman-test
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